DOJ’s National Fraud Enforcement Division Issues First Corporate Enforcement Priorities
On October 1, 2026, Assistant Attorney General Colin M. McDonald issued Directive 26-12, “Corporate Enforcement in the Fight Against Fraud,” setting out the recently established National Fraud Enforcement Division’s corporate enforcement strategy. The Directive calls for an “aggressive, all-tools approach” to corporate fraud and identifies four priority areas: health care; fraud affecting public trust or the financial integrity of Americans and markets; significant tax and revenue evasion; and tariff evasion, import fraud, and forced labor.
The Directive also provides an early look at how the Fraud Division will decide which corporate cases warrant particular attention. Prosecutors are instructed to place “great weight” on ten factors, including management involvement, concealment from government agencies or auditors, misconduct lasting three years or more, conduct spanning at least three federal districts, and conduct causing harm to at least 25 victims or losses of at least $25 million. The Directive also formalizes the involvement of the Division’s Corporate Enforcement Section throughout corporate investigations and resolutions.
At the same time, the Directive preserves DOJ’s broader corporate enforcement framework, including the Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. It also directs Fraud Division leadership to develop additional incentives for whistleblowers—including participants in misconduct—to come forward with credible information. For companies operating in the Division’s priority areas, the Directive provides important new guidance for assessing enforcement risk, conducting internal investigations, and evaluating potential voluntary disclosures. Click here to read the full post.
The Race to Report: DOJ’s Antitrust Division Highlights Leniency, Whistleblowers, and Trial Readiness
On September 22, 2026, Daniel Glad, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in DOJ’s Antitrust Division, delivered remarks at a conference hosted by the Women’s White Collar Defense Association (“WWCDA”), a non-profit organization co-founded by Sidley Senior Counsel Karen Popp. His remarks, among other things, highlighted the interaction between the Division’s Leniency Policy and its newer Whistleblower Rewards Program, as well as the Division’s recent criminal trial record.
Glad emphasized that companies confronting potential criminal antitrust conduct may now face two races: one against other participants seeking leniency and another against potential whistleblowers with independent incentives to report. Because only one participant can obtain leniency, Glad cautioned that companies need not complete an internal investigation before considering whether to seek a marker.
Glad also pointed to the Division’s four consecutive criminal jury trial convictions as evidence of its readiness to litigate cases and its focus on presenting them efficiently. Taken together, his remarks underscore the importance of quickly assessing potential antitrust misconduct, evaluating reporting options early, and preparing for a Division that remains willing to take criminal cases to trial. Click here to read the full post.
No Suspicion Required: Second Circuit Permits Warrantless Manual Cellphone Searches at the Border
On September 17, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the government may manually search a traveler’s cellphone at the border without a warrant or any individualized suspicion. In United States v. Alisigwe, the court concluded that manual cellphone searches qualify as routine border searches, resolving a split among district courts within the Second Circuit.
The decision could have significant implications beyond traditional customs and immigration enforcement. Cellphones can contain communications, financial records, and other evidence relevant to government investigations, and the court reaffirmed that border searches may be conducted for investigative purposes unrelated to border enforcement. Individuals involved in government investigations—and companies whose employees travel internationally—should consider what privileged or sensitive information is accessible on devices carried across the border.
Important questions remain. Alisigwe addressed only a manual search and did not decide whether suspicion is required for more intrusive forensic searches or whether the government may compel a traveler to provide a passcode or biometric authentication. Those issues remain unsettled and are likely to be the subject of further litigation. Click here to read the full blog post.
OCC Proposes Easing Non-Public Information Disclosure Rules and Removing Criminal Penalty References
On August 3, 2026, the OCC proposed a significant overhaul of its rules governing the disclosure of non-public OCC information, including confidential supervisory information (CSI). The proposal would expand the circumstances in which financial institutions may share CSI without prior OCC approval—including with affiliates, service providers, M&A counterparties and certain advisers—and would remove the rules’ express reference to potential criminal liability for unauthorized disclosures.
While the changes could make navigating NPOI substantially easier, they may also create new compliance considerations. As institutions gain greater flexibility to share sensitive supervisory information, they may need to reassess contractual protections and controls designed to prevent recipients from misusing that information.
We examine the proposed framework, the OCC’s shift away from criminal enforcement, and the practical implications for financial institutions and their counsel. Click here to read the full post.
DOJ’s National Fraud Enforcement Division Issues Inaugural Memorandum: Four Key Takeaways
On August 13, 2026, Assistant Attorney General Colin M. McDonald of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) National Fraud Enforcement Division (NFED) issued a memorandum outlining the Division’s mission, organizational structure, and enforcement priorities (the Memo). The White House established NFED in April 2026. As discussed in a prior Sidley update, NFED is tasked with leading a whole-of-government effort to combat fraud “no matter its size or complexity.”
The Memo provides the most detailed public account to date of NFED’s mission, structure and enforcement approach and further underscores the Administration’s focus on anti-fraud enforcement as a signature initiative.
This blog post highlights four key takeaways from the Memo and offers observations for companies navigating this evolving enforcement landscape. Click here to read the full post.
DOJ Renames Criminal Division’s Fraud Section as the “White Collar and Corporate Enforcement” Section
On August 10, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that the Criminal Division’s longstanding Fraud Section has been renamed the White Collar and Corporate Enforcement Section. The change follows the creation of the National Fraud Enforcement Division, which absorbed more than half of the legacy Fraud Section’s personnel and its longstanding mandate to combat fraud against government programs.
The renaming marks a notable development for a Section that has played a central role in DOJ’s corporate and financial crime enforcement for decades. The Section’s roots date to the World War II-era “War Frauds Unit,” and its prosecutors have since handled significant matters involving securities and commodities fraud, health care fraud, foreign bribery, market manipulation, and other complex economic crimes.
The key question is whether the new name reflects a rebranding or signals broader changes in DOJ’s white collar enforcement strategy. Click here to read the full post.
DOJ (Re-)Expands Northeast Health Care Fraud Strike Force to Philadelphia and Charges 19 Defendants in Medicaid Home Care Schemes
On August 4, 2026, DOJ’s National Fraud Enforcement Division (“Fraud Division”) announced a significant expansion of its Northeast Health Care Fraud Strike Force into Philadelphia. The expansion will reunite the Fraud Division’s Health Care Fraud Section with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; in 2018, the same teams launched what was then known as the Philadelphia-Newark Regional Strike Force, before reducing its operations to Newark-only in more recent years. Nationally, since its inception in 2007, the Health Care Fraud Strike Force program has been responsible for prosecuting more than 6,200 defendants who collectively billed federal health care programs and private insurers more than $45 billion.
DOJ Loosens the Whistleblower Program’s Bar on “Other Program” Claimants in Latest Revision
On July 30, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) revised its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, expanding the pool of individuals who may qualify for an award. Most notably, DOJ eliminated the prior rule that automatically disqualified whistleblowers who could have been eligible for an award under another U.S. government whistleblower program, such as those administered by the SEC or CFTC. Instead, a whistleblower is now disqualified only if he or she actually receives an award from another program for reporting the same or substantially the same misconduct, while DOJ retains discretion to reduce or deny duplicative awards.
The revised guidance also includes several administrative updates, including confirmation that the program is now administered by the Criminal Division’s Money Laundering, Narcotics, and Forfeiture Section (formerly the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section) and that submissions will be made through a dedicated online intake portal. The covered subject-matter areas remain unchanged from the May 2025 expansion and continue to include, among other areas, financial institution crimes, bribery, healthcare fraud, trade and customs fraud, procurement fraud, immigration offenses, and sanctions-related misconduct.
For companies, the revisions further strengthen incentives for whistleblowers to report directly to DOJ, including in matters that may also be eligible for other agency whistleblower programs. At the same time, DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy continues to provide a pathway to a declination for companies that promptly self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate misconduct, reinforcing the importance of effective internal reporting mechanisms and careful consideration of self-disclosure decisions in the face of potential whistleblower reports. Click here to read the full post.
