DOJ Loosens the Whistleblower Program’s Bar on “Other Program” Claimants in Latest Revision

On July 30, 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a revised version of its Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program (the “Whistleblower Program”).  The Whistleblower Program initially launched on August 1, 2024, as discussed in a prior Sidley update, and was subsequently revised in May 2025 to broaden the scope to include additional priority subject matters. While much of the program remains intact from the May 2025 revision discussed in a prior Sidley update, this latest revision makes one substantive change that meaningfully widens the potential pool of individuals who may collect an award.

Under the prior versions of the Whistleblower Program, a whistleblower was categorically ineligible if he or she “would be eligible”—meaning, potentially could be eligible— for an award under another U.S. government or statutory whistleblower program (such as those administered by the SEC or CFTC), qui tam, or similar program, had the same information been reported there. The July 2026 revision replaces that eligibility-based bar with a narrower one tied to recovery of money: a whistleblower is now disqualified only if he or she actually receives an award for reporting the same or substantially the same misconduct from another program. A newly added footnote makes the point explicit, explaining that the program is designed to fill gaps in other whistleblower programs and will not issue duplicative awards, but that eligibility for another program no longer automatically renders a whistleblower ineligible under the Whistleblower Program.

To accompany this revision, the DOJ added a new discretionary consideration among the factors that may decrease an award.  The DOJ may deny or reduce an award where the whistleblower has received, or may receive, an award from another program.  The DOJ will consider whether a whistleblower’s information led to distinct or overlapping enforcement actions and whether an award would be duplicative or partially duplicative.

The July 2026 revision also reflects several administrative updates. The published guidance confirms that the Whistleblower Program is managed by the Criminal Division’s (newly renamed) Money Laundering, Narcotics, and Forfeiture Section (formerly the Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section), and submissions now run through a dedicated online intake portal rather than the  prior email and form-based intake. The July 2026 revision does not change covered subject-matter areas, previously expanded in the May 2025 revision, which include certain crimes involving financial institutions; foreign and domestic bribery; certain healthcare offenses; trade, tariff, and customs fraud; federal immigration offenses; procurement and federal program fraud; and violations involving sanctions, terrorism, and cartel-related conduct. As a reminder, since the initial launch and after the expansion of this program, in public remarks, DOJ officials have continuously emphasized that a steady stream of complaints have come in pertaining to subject matters ranging to FCPA, healthcare, laundering, and other topics.

For companies, the practical significance of the program update lies in the widened incentive structure. By removing the automatic disqualification for individuals who could pursue parallel programs, the DOJ increased the universe of potential whistleblowers who may bring information directly to the Criminal Division, including misconduct that might also support an SEC or CFTC submission. That change, combined with the streamlined online intake, may even further increase the volume of tips DOJ receives and reinforces the necessity for robust internal reporting channels that aim to surface issues before they reach the government. It also vastly increases the likelihood that whistleblowers’ counsel will simultaneously report to DOJ alongside other agencies with whistleblower programs, because a concession of eligibility for another program no longer renders a whistleblower ineligible for an award. Companies should ensure their compliance functions account for the possibility that employees now have a clearer path to a DOJ award even where another agency’s program is in play.

Further, while revisions to the program may increase the universe of potential whistleblowers, the DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (CEP) continues to provide a path to declination for companies that voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, fully cooperate, timely and appropriately remediate, and agree to pay required restitution or victim compensation and forfeiture or disgorgement, as applicable, absent specified aggravating circumstances.  The CEP maintains its safe harbor provision which allows companies to qualify for declinations if they self-report misconduct within 120 days of receiving an internal whistleblower report, even if the whistleblower has already reported the matter to DOJ.  The scope of the CEP was discussed in a prior Sidley update. Companies should continue to carefully analyze whether the risk of a whistleblower beating company counsel to DOJ’s door merits self-disclosure.

This post is as of the posting date stated above. Sidley Austin LLP assumes no duty to update this post or post about any subsequent developments having a bearing on this post.