Jul 302026

DOJ Grants First Healthcare Declination Under New Corporate Enforcement Policy While Indicting Founder

Jaime L.M. Jones, Lisa H. Miller and Matt Bergs
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On July 29, 2026, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced that, consistent with Part I of DOJ’s Department-wide Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (“CEP”), it declined to prosecute Campus Eye Management Holdings LLC and its wholly owned subsidiary, Campus Eye Management LLC (collectively, “Campus Eye”), a management services organization that provided billing and other services to an optometry practice and ambulatory surgery center. DOJ had been investigating Campus Eye for alleged healthcare fraud, including illegal kickbacks. This is the first declination involving a healthcare company under the new, Department-wide CEP.  And it is only the second healthcare fraud declination under any voluntary self-disclosure policy in DOJ history—the first being the HealthSun Health Plans, Inc. matter handled by the same team (i.e., the Health Care Fraud Unit) when they were part of the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section, prior to creation of the National Fraud Enforcement Division (“NFED”) earlier this year.

As discussed here, the CEP generally provides a path to declination for companies that voluntarily self-disclose misconduct, fully cooperate, timely and appropriately remediate, and agree to pay required restitution or victim compensation and forfeiture or disgorgement, as applicable, absent specified aggravating circumstances. In explaining the Campus Eye resolution, DOJ cited the company’s timely and voluntary disclosure; full and proactive cooperation, including its agreement to continue cooperating in related investigations and prosecutions (presumably, the prosecution of Campus Eye’s founder, E. Bruce DiDonato); timely and appropriate remediation; the absence of aggravating factors; and its agreement to compensate victims. Regarding remediation, DOJ highlighted that Campus Eye’s efforts included reviewing and revising certain billing, payment, and compensation policies; conducting ongoing risk assessments and monitoring; hiring personnel with compliance responsibilities; and implementing compliance training.

The corporate declination was announced alongside a seven-count indictment of E. Bruce DiDonato. In that case, DOJ alleges that, from at least 2015 through March 2023, DiDonato conspired to defraud Medicare by billing for unnecessary or duplicative diagnostic eye tests and paid kickbacks and bribes to ophthalmologists in exchange for patient referrals. The government further alleges that the payments were concealed through sham consulting agreements and purported monthly “flat fees” that were actually based on a percentage of Medicare reimbursements generated by referred patients. DiDonato allegedly caused the submission of approximately $3.4 million in fraudulent Medicare claims. DOJ’s announcement points out that DiDonato then used those reimbursements to pitch and sell Campus Eye to private equity investors. It would seem those investors then uncovered and reported the fraud to the government through the CEP.

The matter illustrates DOJ’s effort to pair incentives for corporate self-reporting with the continued prosecution of allegedly responsible individuals (i.e., individual accountability) and provides an early healthcare example of how DOJ will apply the CEP.

Significantly, as to structure and DOJ operations, the announcement also highlights that it’s not only the legacy Criminal Division, Fraud Section, Health Care Fraud Unit that has migrated to NFED; personnel from the Fraud Section’s former Corporate Enforcement and Compliance Unit have also shifted. Specifically, the release accompanying the declination described Marnee Rand as Acting Chief of the National Fraud Enforcement Division’s Corporate Enforcement Section.  This strongly signals that NFED will, like the Fraud Section before it, be focused on corporate prosecutions and resolutions in addition to pursuit of investigations against individuals.

This post is as of the posting date stated above. Sidley Austin LLP assumes no duty to update this post or post about any subsequent developments having a bearing on this post.

Jaime L.M. Jones

Chicago

jaime.jones@sidley.com

Lisa H. Miller

Washington, D.C.

lisa.miller@sidley.com

Matt Bergs

Chicago

mbergs@sidley.com

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Section 314(b) and Information Sharing

Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks to provide law enforcement and financial institutions with stronger tools to detect terrorist financing, money laundering, and other illicit finance risks. Section 314(b) of the Patriot Act provides financial institutions with a safe harbor from civil liability for voluntarily sharing customer or transaction information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing with other financial institutions. The provision is based on the premise that financial institutions can spot suspicious activity more effectively when they are allowed to pool information. One institution may only see one piece of a larger scheme—a transfer, login, or withdrawal—that does not look unusual in isolation, but that becomes far more suspicious when paired with information visible to other institutions.

FinCEN’s Updated Guidance and the FDIC’s Financial Institution Letter

FinCEN’s updated guidance and the FDIC’s FIL make several key points for financial institutions:

  • Fraud-related information falls within Section 314(b). The guidance emphasizes that the safe harbor provision is not limited to classic AML fact patterns. Fraud offenses — including mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, health care fraud, and securities fraud — are also “specified unlawful activities” (SUAs) under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), the predicate crimes for money laundering. Accordingly, if a financial institution suspects that a transaction may involve the proceeds of fraud or be intended to further or conceal a fraudulent scheme, it may share related information under the 314(b) safe harbor. Critically, the institution need not have identified specific proceeds of fraud being laundered to trigger the safe harbor’s protections.
  • Institutions may share a broad range of operational data. The BSA imposes no limitations on the types of information that may be shared (with the exception of SARs) or the method by which institutions share information. The fact sheet accompanying FinCEN’s guidance specifically identifies the following as permissible types of data to be shared: transaction information; video surveillance footage; cyber-related data (such as IP addresses and geolocations); device identification numbers; decisions related to account creation, maintenance, closure, or services (and related research and analytical materials); transaction monitoring system alerts; and indicators of suspicious activity — including newly added payees followed by large transfers, multiple accounts with the same or similar identifying information, and login activity from geographically distant locations. Institutions may share information in writing, verbally, or through electronic platforms, and may do so in real time as activity is occurring.
  • Section 314(b) allows institutions to file joint SARs, improving SAR decision-making. FinCEN’s revised guidance encourages institutions to note in SAR narratives whether the filing benefitted from Section 314(b) sharing, and to consider filing joint SARs when institutions identify suspicious activity through Section 314(b) collaboration. Information from another institution may help a bank file a more complete SAR, confirming the suspected scheme, identifying additional parties, or showing where funds went next.
  • Institutions may share information even absent a nexus to the receiving institution’s customers or accounts. The revised guidance emphasizes that institutions may share information that they suspect to be related to possible terrorist activity or money laundering even if the information does not relate to a specific customer or account. This ability enables institutions to proactively disseminate threat intelligence across the Section 314(b) network, allowing receiving institutions to incorporate fraud indicators into their transaction monitoring systems, account-decisioning processes, and broader AML/CFT programs before they are directly affected.”.

Practical Implications for Financial Institutions

FinCEN’s updated guidance, now reinforced by the FDIC’s Financial Institution Letter, represents an expanded interpretation of Section 314(b)’s scope that positions the provision as a fraud-prevention tool alongside its traditional AML compliance function. As reflected in the press release accompanying the guidance, the Trump Administration views this change as part of its broader focus on combatting fraud against private consumers and government programs, in addition to its traditional anti-terrorist financing and AML objectives.

The guidance’s emphasis on real-time and proactive information sharing raises strategic considerations for institutions evaluating their existing 314(b) programs. Fraud schemes depend on delay — by the time one institution completes its internal review, funds may have moved through several accounts or disappeared entirely. Institutions will need to assess whether their information-sharing procedures are designed for the speed that FinCEN now contemplates, and whether internal escalation paths between fraud and AML teams are fast enough to make a difference.

Although participation in Section 314(b) remains voluntary, the FDIC’s FIL may signal increased supervisory attention toward institutions’ Section 314(b) policies and procedures. Examiners may ask whether existing 314(b) policies are too narrow, whether fraud teams know when to escalate sharing opportunities, and whether information-sharing procedures move quickly enough to make a difference. Institutions that have not registered a Section 314(b) program, or that limit such programs to traditional AML scenarios, should be mindful of the gap between current practices and the expectations now reflected in both FinCEN’s guidance and the FIL.

Governance is also a focus. Institutions considering expanded 314(b) activity will need to define who may approve sharing requests, what information may be shared, how the basis for sharing is documented, and how received information is protected. The point is not to share everything, but to build a defensible process that shares the right information, with the right institution, for the right purpose.

Financial institutions with cross-border operations should also consider the safe harbor’s limitations in that context. While 314(b) information may be shared with a foreign affiliate or subsidiary for BSA-permitted purposes, such sharing would not receive safe harbor protection unless the recipient qualifies as a financial institution under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.540(a)(1)(i). Institutions should therefore consider reviewing existing foreign affiliate sharing arrangements with counsel to confirm they are structured to fall within the safe harbor’s scope. Institutions should also remain mindful of obligations under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, applicable state laws, and relevant foreign legal requirements.

More broadly, the guidance reflects the continued convergence of fraud prevention and AML compliance. FinCEN’s updated guidance signals a push toward greater integration between these two functions, and institutions should consider whether their organizational structures, escalation protocols, and technology platforms are positioned for the cross-functional coordination that the guidance contemplates. Because the guidance substantially expands the practical scope of a longstanding but often underutilized program, early consultation with experienced counsel may be particularly important as institutions evaluate how to operationalize these changes.

* * *

FinCEN’s updated guidance, the revised Section 314(b) fact sheet, and registration information are available on the FinCEN website here; the FDIC’s July 9, 2026 Financial Institution Letter is available on the FDIC website here.

 

*Summer Associate Joe Magliocco contributed to this post.

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