Mar 272026

Sidley’s Loss-Eaton Making Supreme Court Debut in Saudi Spy Case

White Collar Watch
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Sidley partner Tobias Loss-Eaton is set to argue his first case before the U.S. Supreme Court, representing a former Twitter employee convicted of spying for Saudi Arabia. The case centers on whether federal prosecutors brought an obstruction charge in the proper venue, raising broader constitutional questions about where criminal cases can be tried. Loss-Eaton, who helped bring the case to the Court through Northwestern’s Supreme Court clinic, now prepares to make his debut at the lectern in a closely watched dispute over the limits of federal venue law.

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This article originally appeared in Bloomberg Law.

This post is as of the posting date stated above. Sidley Austin LLP assumes no duty to update this post or post about any subsequent developments having a bearing on this post.

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Beyond AML: FinCEN and FDIC Clarify That Section 314(b) Safe Harbor Extends to Fraud Prevention

Financial institutions have long used Section 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act primarily as an anti-money laundering (“AML”) tool, but updated guidance from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) on June 12, 2026, reinforced by a Financial Institution Letter (the “FIL”) issued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) on July 9, 2026, makes clear that regulators now expect institutions to use the provision’s safe harbor protections more broadly and proactively to combat fraud, and taken together, these developments highlight Section 314(b)’s potential to assist institutions with detecting suspicious activity faster, making better suspicious activity report (“SAR”) decisions, and coordinating more effectively when illicit funds move across institutions. FinCEN’s updated guidance clarifies that financial institutions can use Section 314(b)’s safe harbor provision to share information related to suspected fraud and explicitly encourages institutions to use it as a front-line fraud-prevention tool in addition to traditional AML purposes. FinCEN’s accompanying press release indicated that the Treasury Department views the guidance as part of the Trump Administration’s broader efforts to address fraud, and the FDIC’s follow-on FIL underscores that same message for FDIC-supervised institutions.

Section 314(b) and Information Sharing

Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks to provide law enforcement and financial institutions with stronger tools to detect terrorist financing, money laundering, and other illicit finance risks. Section 314(b) of the Patriot Act provides financial institutions with a safe harbor from civil liability for voluntarily sharing customer or transaction information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing with other financial institutions. The provision is based on the premise that financial institutions can spot suspicious activity more effectively when they are allowed to pool information. One institution may only see one piece of a larger scheme—a transfer, login, or withdrawal—that does not look unusual in isolation, but that becomes far more suspicious when paired with information visible to other institutions.

FinCEN’s Updated Guidance and the FDIC’s Financial Institution Letter

FinCEN’s updated guidance and the FDIC’s FIL make several key points for financial institutions:

  • Fraud-related information falls within Section 314(b). The guidance emphasizes that the safe harbor provision is not limited to classic AML fact patterns. Fraud offenses — including mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, health care fraud, and securities fraud — are also “specified unlawful activities” (SUAs) under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), the predicate crimes for money laundering. Accordingly, if a financial institution suspects that a transaction may involve the proceeds of fraud or be intended to further or conceal a fraudulent scheme, it may share related information under the 314(b) safe harbor. Critically, the institution need not have identified specific proceeds of fraud being laundered to trigger the safe harbor’s protections.
  • Institutions may share a broad range of operational data. The BSA imposes no limitations on the types of information that may be shared (with the exception of SARs) or the method by which institutions share information. The fact sheet accompanying FinCEN’s guidance specifically identifies the following as permissible types of data to be shared: transaction information; video surveillance footage; cyber-related data (such as IP addresses and geolocations); device identification numbers; decisions related to account creation, maintenance, closure, or services (and related research and analytical materials); transaction monitoring system alerts; and indicators of suspicious activity — including newly added payees followed by large transfers, multiple accounts with the same or similar identifying information, and login activity from geographically distant locations. Institutions may share information in writing, verbally, or through electronic platforms, and may do so in real time as activity is occurring.
  • Section 314(b) allows institutions to file joint SARs, improving SAR decision-making. FinCEN’s revised guidance encourages institutions to note in SAR narratives whether the filing benefitted from Section 314(b) sharing, and to consider filing joint SARs when institutions identify suspicious activity through Section 314(b) collaboration. Information from another institution may help a bank file a more complete SAR, confirming the suspected scheme, identifying additional parties, or showing where funds went next.
  • Institutions may share information even absent a nexus to the receiving institution’s customers or accounts. The revised guidance emphasizes that institutions may share information that they suspect to be related to possible terrorist activity or money laundering even if the information does not relate to a specific customer or account. This ability enables institutions to proactively disseminate threat intelligence across the Section 314(b) network, allowing receiving institutions to incorporate fraud indicators into their transaction monitoring systems, account-decisioning processes, and broader AML/CFT programs before they are directly affected.”.

Practical Implications for Financial Institutions

FinCEN’s updated guidance, now reinforced by the FDIC’s Financial Institution Letter, represents an expanded interpretation of Section 314(b)’s scope that positions the provision as a fraud-prevention tool alongside its traditional AML compliance function. As reflected in the press release accompanying the guidance, the Trump Administration views this change as part of its broader focus on combatting fraud against private consumers and government programs, in addition to its traditional anti-terrorist financing and AML objectives.

The guidance’s emphasis on real-time and proactive information sharing raises strategic considerations for institutions evaluating their existing 314(b) programs. Fraud schemes depend on delay — by the time one institution completes its internal review, funds may have moved through several accounts or disappeared entirely. Institutions will need to assess whether their information-sharing procedures are designed for the speed that FinCEN now contemplates, and whether internal escalation paths between fraud and AML teams are fast enough to make a difference.

Although participation in Section 314(b) remains voluntary, the FDIC’s FIL may signal increased supervisory attention toward institutions’ Section 314(b) policies and procedures. Examiners may ask whether existing 314(b) policies are too narrow, whether fraud teams know when to escalate sharing opportunities, and whether information-sharing procedures move quickly enough to make a difference. Institutions that have not registered a Section 314(b) program, or that limit such programs to traditional AML scenarios, should be mindful of the gap between current practices and the expectations now reflected in both FinCEN’s guidance and the FIL.

Governance is also a focus. Institutions considering expanded 314(b) activity will need to define who may approve sharing requests, what information may be shared, how the basis for sharing is documented, and how received information is protected. The point is not to share everything, but to build a defensible process that shares the right information, with the right institution, for the right purpose.

Financial institutions with cross-border operations should also consider the safe harbor’s limitations in that context. While 314(b) information may be shared with a foreign affiliate or subsidiary for BSA-permitted purposes, such sharing would not receive safe harbor protection unless the recipient qualifies as a financial institution under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.540(a)(1)(i). Institutions should therefore consider reviewing existing foreign affiliate sharing arrangements with counsel to confirm they are structured to fall within the safe harbor’s scope. Institutions should also remain mindful of obligations under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, applicable state laws, and relevant foreign legal requirements.

More broadly, the guidance reflects the continued convergence of fraud prevention and AML compliance. FinCEN’s updated guidance signals a push toward greater integration between these two functions, and institutions should consider whether their organizational structures, escalation protocols, and technology platforms are positioned for the cross-functional coordination that the guidance contemplates. Because the guidance substantially expands the practical scope of a longstanding but often underutilized program, early consultation with experienced counsel may be particularly important as institutions evaluate how to operationalize these changes.

* * *

FinCEN’s updated guidance, the revised Section 314(b) fact sheet, and registration information are available on the FinCEN website here; the FDIC’s July 9, 2026 Financial Institution Letter is available on the FDIC website here.

 

*Summer Associate Joe Magliocco contributed to this post.

HHS-OIG Decertifies New York Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, Escalating Federal Scrutiny of State Medicaid Fraud Enforcement

The Administration has taken another significant step in its effort to increase pressure on state Medicaid Fraud Control Units (“MFCUs”). On July 2, 2026, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of New York announced the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (“HHS-OIG”) denied recertification of New York’s MFCU and suspended its federal funding effective July 1. The decision follows the Administration’s announcements earlier this year that it would closely scrutinize state MFCU performance, including through funding consequences for states perceived as failing to aggressively investigate and prosecute Medicaid fraud, which we previously covered here.

Supreme Court Upholds SEC Authority to Obtain Disgorgement Without Actual Loss But Leaves Important Questions Unanswered

On June 4, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated ruling in Sripetch v. Securities and Exchange Commission, upholding the SEC’s ability to obtain disgorgement of ill-gotten gains without first proving that investors actually suffered financial losses. The ruling is a clear win for the SEC, as it allows the Commission to use disgorgement to recover profits from an unlawful securities scheme even when investors’ losses are hard to measure or wholly absent.