Mar 62026
New U.S. DOJ Antitrust Leadership Signals More Criminal Prosecutions and Longer Prison Sentences
Two weeks after a leadership shakeup in the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement Daniel W. Glad stressed in his first public remarks that the Division’s criminal enforcement program will remain highly active and that individuals involved in criminal antitrust offenses should continue to expect lengthy prison sentences. To drive home this message, Glad highlighted the fact that the Antitrust Division opened nearly 100 criminal investigations in FY 2025 and secured prison sentences that reflected more than a 1,200% increase in prison days imposed year-over-year. He cautioned that individuals who commit criminal antitrust offenses should “be aware that what’s on the line isn’t just a fine — it’s their … liberty.”
Companies and individuals operating in highly regulated industries and frequent antitrust targets — such as healthcare, agriculture, defense contracting, telecom, financial services, and technology — should take particular note.
I. DOJ’s New Antitrust Leadership
The sudden departure of Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Gail Slater left uncertainty over the direction of antitrust enforcement at DOJ, as discussed in Sidley’s February Antitrust and Competition Bulletin. By selecting Glad as the Antitrust Division’s new lead criminal prosecutor, Acting AAG Omeed Assefi — who previously headed the Division’s criminal enforcement program — made clear that the Division will continue to vigorously prosecute criminal antitrust offenses.
Glad brings extensive experience prosecuting criminal antitrust cases in the Antitrust Division. Most recently, he led the Antitrust Division’s Procurement Collusion Strike Force (PCSF) and previously served as the Acting Director of Criminal Enforcement — in addition to holding leadership roles in the Antitrust Division’s New York and Chicago offices, which largely focus on criminal investigations and prosecutions.
II. U.S. DOJ’s Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Priorities
In his remarks, Glad articulated a vision for aggressive criminal antitrust enforcement centered on deterrence, highlighting the PCSF and Antitrust Whistleblower Rewards Program as important tools to advance that objective.
1. An Aggressive Model of Deterrence
Glad emphasized individual accountability and deterrence as fundamental to the Antitrust Division’s criminal enforcement program. “General deterrence is not achieved through press releases,” he said. “It is achieved when market participants understand that cartel conduct can lead to prison.” For that reason, he explained that seeking significant prison sentences is “central to the Antitrust Division’s deterrence model.”
He also underscored that white-collar defendants should not expect more lenient treatment than other criminal defendants, citing judicial remarks that some white-collar offenders “expect better, more lenient” outcomes at sentencing. In Glad’s framing, prison “is not just a theoretical risk” for individuals involved in cartel conduct. The Antitrust Division, he explained, pursues substantial prison sentences not only to punish past misconduct but also to “deter the next conspiracy.”
To reinforce the point, Glad highlighted the Antitrust Division’s recent sentencing results. In FY 2025, the Antitrust Division opened nearly 100 criminal investigations and filed 24% more criminal cases than in the prior year. Notably, he touted a more than 1,200% increase in the number of prison days imposed in the Antitrust Division’s criminal cases in FY 2025 compared with the year before.
2. The Procurement Collusion Strike Force
Glad also highlighted the work of the PCSF, which he led before stepping into his current role. He described the program’s mission to protect public funds as central to the Antitrust Division’s broader deterrence efforts. According to Glad, the PCSF has trained 46,000 agents and procurement officials, launched 195 investigations, secured 75 guilty pleas and trial convictions, and recovered over $70 million in fines and restitution. He also emphasized that these figures will continue to grow and that the PCSF now accounts for nearly 50% of the Antitrust Division’s open investigations, underscoring procurement as a sustained enforcement priority.
3. The Antitrust Division’s Whistleblower Rewards Program
Of course, the Antitrust Division’s Whistleblower Rewards Program, which within months of launch resulted in a corporate plea in a bid-rigging investigation and a $1 million award for the whistleblower, was also discussed. (For more on this program and case, see prior Sidley article.) Glad described the program as one of the Antitrust Division’s “new tools and new programs to enhance [its] abilities to detect and prosecute antitrust cartels.” He reported that the program has already had its intended effect by leading to “a surge in whistleblower submissions” and “a substantial number of credible tips” currently under investigation.
Glad indicated that the program may meaningfully affect the Antitrust Division’s longstanding leniency program. Historically, the race to self-report misconduct was “company versus company” — with protections provided to the first company to voluntarily self-report a criminal antitrust offense. Now, as Glad put it, there is “another lane in the leniency race: insider versus company.” Because employees and other market participants now have a significant financial incentive to report antitrust crimes, the window for corporate self-reporting may narrow. Glad suggested that the Antitrust Division expects companies to respond by seeking leniency more promptly and by strengthening compliance programs capable of surfacing and investigating issues at an early stage.
III. Key Takeaways and Practical Considerations
Glad’s remarks signal that the push for criminal antitrust enforcement is growing stronger during the second Trump administration. While the DOJ’s recent antitrust leadership changes created uncertainty about enforcement priorities, the speech delivered a message that the Antitrust Division does not intend to moderate its criminal enforcement posture.
In this environment, companies can help minimize their antitrust risks with the following steps.
1. Consider elevating antitrust compliance to the forefront.
Potential steps include:
- Refreshing cartel and bid-rigging training, particularly for commercial, sales, and procurement-facing teams
- Integrating new and emerging technology tools, including generative AI, to help prevent and detect potential wrongdoing
- Stress-testing internal reporting / whistleblower channels and escalation protocols to ensure concerns reach legal departments quickly
- Reviewing document retention and communication practices in high-risk functions, including messaging platforms
- Conducting targeted audits of competitor contacts and trade association participation
- Revisiting dawn raid and subpoena response protocols to ensure readiness
2. Because procurement remains a core enforcement focus, consider proactive reviews of bidding processes and related controls if your company interacts with public contracts.
Potential steps include:
- Reviewing bidding protocols to ensure clear separation from competitors and strict controls around communications
- Auditing prior bids for patterns that could raise red flags, such as bid rotation, market allocation, or consistent subcontractor arrangements
- Tightening controls around subcontractor and consultant selection, including due diligence and conflict certifications
- Reviewing use of personal devices or off-channel communications in connection with bids
- Coordinating antitrust and False Claims Act risk assessments for government-facing business units
This post is as of the posting date stated above. Sidley Austin LLP assumes no duty to update this post or post about any subsequent developments having a bearing on this post.
